The British Failure in Iraq

The current spasm of violence in the southern Iraqi city of Basra will undoubtedly be used by opponents of the war as proof that the surge has failed and therefore we should exit Iraq. A more thoughtful analysis shows the exact opposite it true.

During the Rumsfeld era, the United States pursued a light footprint strategy based on the assumption that foreign forces were more a cause of violence than an answer to it. The British in southern Iraq were held up as a model of this strategy. The media was full of praise for British competence in being non-confrontational and letting the Iraqis work things out for themselves. If the strategy that appeared to be working for the British was not working for the Americans, it was only because American troops were still being too aggressive.

As the Rumsfeld strategy became an obvious failure, the United States decided to change course and employ the “surge”, abandoning the light footprint and imposing order by force, to give legitimate institutions and civil society an opportunity to take root. The stunning success of the surge raises the question, how could a British strategy so diametrically opposed also work? As events of the past week have shown us, it did not.

As we can now see, the British strategy of an extreme light footprint and essential pacifism in southern Iraq failed. By allowing local militias to take control of the southern provinces unopposed, the British produced the temporary illusion of security that is the inevitable outcome of allowing the enemy to consolidate control of territory. The “peace” produced was the peace of the warlord. The stability of the mafia dominated neighborhood. This type of peace endures only so long as the thugs in charge are not opposed in their reign of terror.

When the Iraqi government with American support began to attempt to rein in the Shia militias and Iranian backed “special groups”, the city exploded with the violence that the British had never defused. Now the task of pacifying the province is made far more difficult, because the militias have had so much time to organize and integrate themselves into the apparatus of local government. The evidence of this is that Iraqi army units brought in from other parts of the country are fighting well, but the local police, being a wholly owned subsidiary of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and/or Iran are are deserting en mass.

The solution to the chaos in Basra is the same as it was in Baghdad. The Iraqi national army, with coalition support must retake the city by force, crush the Shia militias and stay to maintain order while legitimate institutions take root. If this strategy is followed in the south, it will have the same success as it did in other areas of Iraq, only this time with the blood of Iraqi troops, rather than British.

The lesson to be learned from the British failure in Basra is that appeasement does produce peace… but only for a time.